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IMPACT OF THE ACQUISITION
INDEBTEDNESS PROVISIONS OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1969 ON CORPORATE
MERGERS
LEONARD L. SILVERSTEIN*
The crescendo which the corporate merger movement in the
United States had reached in late 1968 and early 1969 was sharply in-
terrupted by the sudden and harshly strident note struck by House
Ways and Means Committee Chairman, Wilbur D. Mills, when he
introduced H.R. 74891 on February 24, 1969.
That Bill, the significance of which was signalled by the Chair-
man's personal sponsorship,2 would have disallowed the deduction for
interest paid or accrued by a corporation with respect to debt issued as
consideration in connection with a plan of acquisition of stock of an-
other corporation.3 H.R. 7489 also denied installment method treat-
ment of reporting gain to sellers of shares in exchange for corporate
debt issued "with interest coupons or in registered form.' 4
The echo resounding from Chairman Mills' thunderclap, while
first heard before the Congress was wholly committed to broad tax
revision, proved to be a significant aspect of H.R. 13270, the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969. As the content of the measure was refined in the
legislative process, the dimensions of the statute (now section 279 of
the Code)5 were considerably narrowed. And although the alteration
0 Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B., Yale University, 1943; LL.B., Har-
vard University, 1948.
1 H.R. REP. No. 7489, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter HR 7489].
2 Preceding the introduction of HR 7489, Chairman Mills issued a press release in
which he "expressed his concern with the increasing trend in recent months towards con-
glomerate mergers." Mr. Mills questioned "whether it was good either for the shareholders
or for the economy as a whole for those conglomerate mergers to occur." He "urged com-
panies to go slow in conglomerate mergers if they are depending upon any of the tax
provisions . . . for the success of their mergers." House Committee on Ways and Means
Release (Feb. 10, 1969).
3 HR 7489 § 277.
4Id.
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 [hereinafter I.R.C.], as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
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in the statute's scope may be attributed in part to the normal evolution
of the tax legislation, commentary presented at the hearings and specific
issues raised by affected parties suggest that the ultimate message de-
livered by the 1969 legislation is the signal, publicly given, that its
terms represent the first of several stages of a general reexamination of
the federal tax treatment of corporate combinations.
This paper will describe briefly the setting within which H.R. 7489
was introduced and, by comparing it with section 279 and the related
debt discount and premium provisions of the 1969 legislation as finally
enacted, will seek to analyze the role which these rules play in terms of
effecting nontaxable corporate combinations under present law. From
the foregoing, it is hoped some perspective may be derived from which
the anticipated reexamination of the merger field more generally may
be viewed.
I. BACKGROUND
If the newsworthiness of technical tax matters is a test of financial
and popular viability, it also is a manifestation that a high water mark
in use has been reached or, as is often the case, has already passed.6 Such
appears to have been the situation in the early part of 1969. The pre-
ceding year had accounted, the Ways and Means Committee observed,
in large acquisitions exceeding $12 billion, a dollar amount which
was triple the average rate of manufacturing and mining acquisitions
during 1965 and 1966.8 As of the early part of 1969, acquisition activity
was progressing at an annual rate of $20 billion.9
The role played by federal tax considerations in motivating these
transactions was publicly noted both by the outgoing and incoming
administrations and by financial commentators. Testifying before the
Ways and Means Committee, Dr. Willard Mueller of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) called attention to an address by a "public re-
lations official" made in November, 1968 reflecting, in Dr. Mueller's
6 For a somewhat narrower illustration, see Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1968, at 1,
col. 6, relating to restricted stock arrangements involving stock of publicly held corpora-
tions other than the employer corporation. Following publication of the article, changes
were proposed in Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1966). See 33 Fed. Reg. 15,870 (1968); TIR-998
(Oct. 26, 1968); Treasury Department Release (Oct. 26, 1968). Ultimately, § 321 of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, adding § 83 to the I.R.C., legislatively changed the rules con-
cerning restricted stock.
7 See H.R. REP. No. 415, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 101 (1969).
8 See also BUREAU OF EcoNoMIcs, FTC, ECONOMIc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 4
(1969) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], wherein it is stated:
Merger activity has registered progressive increases since the early 1950's and has
reached record levels in the 1960's. Acquired manufacturing and mining assets
averaged about $5 billion annually during 1965 and 1966, rose to $10 billion in
1967 and to $15 billion in 1968.
9Id.
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view, "the enthusiasm which debt-equity switching has generated in
some financial circles."'10 Representative John Byrnes, senior Republi-
can on the House Ways and Means Committee, directed the Com-
mittee's attention to an article, "The Merger Movement Rides High,"
appearing in Fortune magazine, which dealt with the subject of
"audacious acquirers" and emphasized the extent to which federal tax
laws subsidize acquisitions. 1 The retiring Commissioner of Internal
Revenue took issue with the validity of the rationale supporting the
nonrecognition rules respecting mergers.12
Concern with the problem was also expressed by Chairman Hamer
H. Budge of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
testimony before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce where, on February 25, 1969, he stated that "another phe-
nomenon of the current acquisition movement is the shift towards the
use of debt, securities and bank loans to finance acquisitions as com-
pared with the use of current available cash or stock of the acquiring
company." ' And newly appointed Assistant Attorney General, Richard
10 Dr. Mueller's illustration follows:
A [firm] using subordinated debentures, convertible securities and/or warrants
can afford to pay a big premium for an old-line company with no debt. To get the
wherewithal for his offer, all he needs is his own printing press to print the secu-
rities he is using to make his tender. And he can afford to offer a big increase in
investment income to the stockholders of the target because he has the federal tax
laws going for him.
He will leap at the chance to offer a $50 debenture paying $3 interest for a
stock selling at $40 and paying a $2 dividend. Why not? He actually makes money
in the deal. For every share of stock he gets through his tender, he makes $2 in
dividends. On this he pays only about 15 cents per share in taxes because the
dividend is an intracompany dividend and the Treasury excludes 85 percent of
such dividends from taxation. At the same time, the $3 in interest he pays out
is a cost of doing business for tax purposes. Each $3 he pays out cost him only
$1.50 [after taxes]. So he's taking in $1.85 in dividends after taxes and paying
out $1.50 after taxes. Thus for every share he gets in his tender he makes 35 cents.
He can afford to run his printing presses overtime creating funny money by the
truckload.
Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 2419 (1969) [hereinafter HEARINGS].
11 Suppose the stock of a rather languid company is selling at $70 a share and
paying $4. Comes a raider offering a $90 convertible debenture paying $6, plus
maybe some warrants to sweeten the pot. The raider times his offer so that the
dividends . . . then become intercompany dividends, which are 85 percent tax
deductible; and the raider thus keeps about $3.40 of the $4. What is more, the$6 interest on the debentures he offers is a business expense and tax deductible,
and so costs less than $3. The raider, thanks to federal tax laws, makes more
than 40 cents on each share tendered him, often more than enough to pay all
expenses.
Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 79, reprinted in HARt-
Inqs at 2402.
12 Cohen, Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A.J. 40 (1969).
13 One reason for the increasing use of debt financing may be the fact that the tax
laws appear to encourage this method of financing take-overs. Chairman Budge added that:
I am fully aware that the problem of dosing possible tax loopholes is an intricate
one. Nevertheless, we cannot help but note the extent to which tax considerations
1970]
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W. McLaren, in a maiden speech before the National Industrial Con-
ference Board on March 6, 1969, warned that he had "serious concern
over the severe human and economic dislocations which are resulting
from the current tax-propelled merger mania."' 4
Not without significance is the fact that on January 29, 1969, a
prospectus was issued describing a proposed tender offer of subordi-
nated debentures and warrants by an issuing company which accom-
panied the offer with a statement, inter alia, that "based on the Pro
Forma Statement of Earnings (Loss) of [the acquiring corporation
alone, the issuer] could not meet the interest requirements on the
debentures out of earnings."' 5 The prospectus also stated that the
offering company had received an opinion from its counsel that al-
though stockholders of the selling company would realize gain or loss
for federal income tax purposes, that a stockholder in whose hands the
shares to be exchanged constituted capital assets and who realized gain
by reason of acceptance of the offer could elect to "postpone such gain
and to report it on the installment basis under section 453 of the
Internal Revenue Code. '16 Other eminent counsel had opened similarly
with respect to installment treatment.'7
Viewed in the foregoing light, Chairman Mills' introduction of
H.R. 7489 (accompanied by a press statement in which the Chairman
"questioned whether it was good either for the shareholders or for the
economy as a whole for these conglomerate mergers to occur"),', if
unusual, could hardly be called surprising. Hearings on this proposal 9
not unexpectedly produced testimony from the SEC, the FTC and
the Justice Department supporting the concept of the legislation.
Other witnesses from the business community, concerned with "take-
affect the techniques of corporate combinations. One important factor is the im-
pact of the deduction allowed for interest payments.
14 Remarks by Richard W. McLaren, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., United States
Dep't of Justice, before the National Industrial Conference Board, March 6, 1969.
15 NVF Co., EXCHANGE OFFER FOR CoMndoN STOCK OF SHARON STEEL CORP. 4 (Jan. 29,
1969).
16 Id. at 7-8.
17 CRANE Co., OFFER OF EXCHANGE TO HOLDERS OF COMMION STOCK OF WESTINGHOUSE
AIR BRAKE Co. 6-7 (Apr. 8, 1968); TENNECO, INC., NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF SHARE-
HOLDERS 3-5 (July 16, 1969).
18 House Committee on Ways and Means Release, supra note 2. "The financing is
top heavy with debt securities. [This] will have a serious impact on government revenues
by converting what formerly were non-deductible dividend payments into tax deductible
interest payments." Id.
19 See HEARINGs at 2363 passim. The hearings were held under the heading "Tax
Provisions Relating to Corporate Mergers" and thus were not directly limited to the
debt-equity switching problem.
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overs" and the issuance of complicated securities attending such
combinations, also supported the legislation."
The tax effects to the acquiring corporation and the selling share-
holders involve a group of issues which, while involving some uncer-
tainty prior to the introduction of H.R. 7489, now are the subject of
special treatment in amendments to the Code made in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.
These issues may be summarized as follows.
1. Interest
The threshold question which concerns any transaction utilizing
subordinated debentures relates to their characterization as debt, allow-
ing the issuer to deduct periodic payments from gross income as
"interest."21
While it is believed that in most instances of debt-financed acquisi-
tions effected in recent years, counsel have advised, formally or in-
formally (and/or the principals have assumed), that payments de-
nominated as interest were deductible, in some instances rulings from
the Internal Revenue Service were sought.22 Favorable rulings would
issue in those situations in which, on the basis of a pro-forma consolida-
tion of the acquired and acquiring entities, sufficient criteria, drawn
from the decided cases, established the existence of a debtor-creditor
relationship. 23 Where the issuing company's shares were publicly held,
the Service's chief concern centered around the ability of the surviving
corporation to meet "coverage" tests, comparable to those now reflected
in section 279, respecting adequate equity in relation to debt and
adequate earnings in relation to interest costs.
In perceptively analyzing the area in terms of the parties' negotiat-
ing relationship, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Randolph W.
Thrower has suggested that shareholders who sell a successful going
concern in exchange for convertible debentures are bargaining for
"the right through conversion to participate in future growth" and
that therefore such persons "may well be more interested in cashing
in on the stock rise than in collecting a debt. '24 By framing the issue
20 Objections to the proposal were reflected in statements filed with the Ways and
Means Committee which pointed out, inter alia, that the ability of small companies with-
out access to the stock market to issue debt would be restricted. HEAuNGS at 2504-05.
21 I.R.C. § 163.
22 See INTEmRTATE BAKERIEs CORP., PROSPECruS 4-5 (Oct. 22, 1965).
23 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54, 1968-1 Cumr. BULL. 69.
24 Remarks by Randolph W. Thrower, Comm'r of Internal Revenue, before the
American Bar Association National Institute, Oct. 23, 1969.
1970]
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in terms of subjective intent, the Commissioner has sharpened the
relevancy of considerations heretofore largely considered in the con-
text of closely held corporations. Among the other elements present
in the "general circumstances" referred to by the Commissioner (which
may not be present in every debt-financed acquisition) were: where a
debenture issue was of such magnitude that the issuing company could
not itself have marketed the debentures for cash; and circumstances
where the historical earnings of an acquired corporation (often already
indebted to third persons) and the issuing corporation, even when com-
bined, may not support the debt service required by the debentures,
unless "extremely profitable" "substantial growth" results from the
business amalgamation.
Except in those situations in which dosing agreements were en-
tered into or in which favorable rulings have issued on the basis of
unchanged and fully disclosed facts which are honored as a matter of
administrative policy, the Treasury remains in a posture to challenge
the deduction for interest in an appropriate situation. Whether this
issue, if in fact raised by the Government, particularly in the provoca-
tive case discussed by Commissioner Thrower, can be successfully
maintained remains to be determined.
A successful assault by the Treasury upon characterization of
debentures used to finance an acquisition may, of course, spawn an
array of altered tax effects at both the level of the holder of the instru-
ment and the corporation. 25 If the debenture is regarded as equity,
its characterization as "preferred" stock would appear most probable.
While ostensibly the preferred would be regarded as nonvoting be-
cause the debenture does not possess voting rights, the holder (of a
convertible debenture or a debenture with warrants attached) is in a
position to become a voting shareholder through the exercise of his
conversion rights or the "put" of his warrant. Normally, in both in-
stances, such rights fully exist without the payment of additional con-
sideration, since surrender of the debentures constitutes an exercise of
the conversion right or (in many cases) payment of all or part of the
warrant price. Indeed, it is the element of unrelinquished proprietary
presence (reflected in the inchoate right to vote) which, if of sufficient
25 See, e.g., W.H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433 (1957), where shareholders of the acquired
corporation received notes and bonds of the acquiring corporation in exchange for their
stock. The Revenue Service unsuccessfully argued that the acquiring corporation was so
thinly capitalized that the bonds were, in substance, equity, resulting in a nontaxable
reorganization. See also Estate of Ernest G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909 (1958), aff'd sub nom.,
Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (Ist Cir. 1959); Ralph M. Heintz, 25 T.C. 132
(1955), not acquiesced in, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 7.
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strength to vitiate the debtor-creditor relationship of the parties,
should, in turn, suggest a continuity of ownership possessing "reor-
ganization" indicia.
Whether the statutory requirements of section 368 are also satis-
fied is, of course, quite another matter, the answers to which may well
depend upon local law and the transactional form. Where a statutory
merger constitutes the vehicle whereby the issuing company directly
accomplished the acquisition or where the issuing company formed (or
used) a subsidiary for that purpose (as the acquiring entity into which
the acquired company was merged), the requisite exchange of stock or
securities has taken place and section 368(a)(1)(A) or (a)(2)(D) pre-
sumably applies. And for the reasons noted respecting the assumed
failure of the sellers to convert their position from shareholder to
creditor status, the requisite continuity of ownership has been main-
tained. Although sellers who receive warrants would be treated as hav-
ing received "boot" for purposes of section 356, its presence would
not be expected to destroy the reorganization since the value of the
boot would have been limited because of attempted compliance with
the installment election provisions. 26
If, on the other hand, the issuing corporation's "plan" consisted
of a tender of its securities for shares of the company to be acquired, it
is unlikely that a reorganization could be regarded as having occurred.
In that instance, the exchanging shareholders' lack of present right to
vote and the presence of the warrant result in failure to satisfy the
"solely for voting stock" requirement of both a "B" and "C" reorganiza-
tion .2
7
It is difficult to predict the direction which a governmental conten-
tion may take respecting the above-described points. Although reor-
ganization characterization may exonerate most shareholder level gain,
it could also cause a denial of a substantial step-up in basis at the
corporate level (assuming the issuing company had desired to, and
did, appropriately liquidate the acquired entity).2 Revenues derivable
from the reduction of the basis may be more readily available, in
26 Under section 453(b)(2), the value of the warrants may not exceed 30 percent of
the selling price if the installment method is to be elected. Boot can be received in a
statutory merger, under present Service policy, in an aggregate amount not exceeding
50 percent of the value of the consideration received. See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 CuA.
BuLL. 1232.
27 Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942); William H. Bateman,
40 T.C. 408 (1963), not acquiesced in, 1965-2 Ctan. BuLL. 7; Treas. Reg. § 1.354-1(e) (1955),
Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 9, at 12. See also Commissioner v. Baan, 382
F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), afTfd on other grounds sub noma. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391
U.S. 83 (1968); Levant v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1967).
28 I.R.C. § 362(b).
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practical audit terms, than those which would result from recognized
gain at the level of the multitudinous shareholders often involved in
the acquisition of the shares of a widely held concern.
However the transaction is characterized at the corporate level, it
would also appear that the amount payable periodically with respect
to the debentures, if not deductible as interest, would be treated as
nondeductible dividends on preferred stock..2 9
At the shareholder level, characterization of the debentures as
equity rather than debt may generate equal, if not greater, adverse tax
consequences. While treatment of the acquisition as a reorganization
may operate to defer full recognition of gain to the shareholders
(through a reduction in basis),30 the warrants or other property re-
ceived in the acquisition will be considered boot and may be taxable as
a dividend.31 Moreover, there is some exposure to the risk that repay-
ment of the debentures by the acquiring corporation would also be
treated as a dividend distribution unless the redemption falls within
the "safe-harbors" provided by section 302.32
2. Original Issue Discount
Pre-1970 questions respecting original issue discount may be at-
tributed to the inevitable lag between language of a statute, intended
to meet one set of observed facts, and the more precise language later
found necessary to cope with a variant of those facts, existing later in
differing and more complex circumstances.
Drafted to equate the tax treatment of bond sales with their re-
tirement for cash,33 section 1232 did not, in all probability, contem-
20 See, e.g., R.C. Owen Co. v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 967 (1966); Moughon v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1964).
80 I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 358(a).
31 Under section 356(a)(2), the payment of boot to shareholders in connection with a
reorganization which "has the effect of the distribution of a dividend" is taxable at
ordinary income rates to the extent of gain realized in the transaction, but not in excess
of each stockholder's "ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the
corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913." Where the distribution to shareholders
is pro rata, it will be deemed to have the effect of a dividend. See Bazley v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 737 (1947); Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945). Moreover, while
the phrase "of a corporation" in section 356(a)(2) generally has been interpreted to refer
to the acquired corporation, one court utilized the earnings and profits of both the
acquired and the acquiring corporations to test whether boot distributions were taxable
as dividends. Compare James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964) with Davant v. Commis-
sioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 1022 (1967).
32 See Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1969); Ambassador Apts., Inc.,
v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1969); Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d
24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Fellinger v. United States, 363 F.2d
826 (6th Cir. 1966).
33 See I.R.C. § 117(o (1939), the predecessor of I.R.C. § 1232(a)(1).
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plate the treatment of bonds initially issued at a discount, whether for
money or for other property. In general, section 1232, as enacted in
1954, contemplated issuance of bonds for cash; the possibility that debt
would be issued as consideration for the acquisition of property having
a value less than the bonds' face amount does not clearly appear to
have been considered by the draftsmen 5 Even more remote was the
possible generation of such an original issue discount where the-
acquisition of the sellers' stock or assets was effected through use of
convertible bonds or some more exotic combination of debt securities
with warrants or other rights to acquire common shares.
Such, however, were the points which came to light as counsel con-
sidered the tax effects of debt-financed acquisitions.36 Also pertinent
was the interplay of the revenue effect between the issuing company
and the holder. Prior to 1970, a gap in the reporting of income gen-
erated by the issuance of bonds at a discount existed due to the issuer's
deduction of a portion of the discount under long-settled regulations,37
whereas a cash basis holder did not include any portion of such discount
in income until the bonds were sold or retired.38
In the case of convertible bonds, regulations applicable to the
holder under section 1232, originally silent on the point,39 ultimately
provided that value attributable to the conversion feature constitutes
part of issue price,40 thus restricting both the amount deducted by the
issuer and the amount included in the holder's income. Where bonds
are issued with warrants, the regulations apply a rule allocating cost
to the warrants (in terms of the relative fair market value of the bonds
and warrants). 41
34 See Commissioner v. Caulkins, 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944). But see United States
v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 US. 54 (1965); I.T. 3486, 1941-2 Cum. BuLL. 76.
35 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84, A275-77 (1954); S. RP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 112-13, 433-36 (1954).
30 See, e.g., TNNEco, INc., NoTiCE OF SPECIAL MEETI OF STocanorn.Rs 4 (July 16,
1969).
37 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(a)(1), T.D. 6984, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6, at 8.
88Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c), T.D. 6984, 1969 INr. Ray¢. BuLL. No. 6, at 7-8. I.R.C.
§ 1232(a)(3), as amended by § 413(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, now requires ratable
inclusion of original issue discount in the gross income of the holder. The issuer must
annually supply information to the holder and the Treasury regarding the amount of
original issue discount so includible. See I.R.C. § 6049.
39 See T.). 6253, 1957-2 Cur. BuLL. 547, 556-59, as amended, T). 6468, 1960-1 Cu .
BuLL. 304; T.D. 6935, 1967-2 Cur. BuLL. 272, 287.
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(i), TID. 6984, 1969 INT. REv. BuLs. No. 6, at 11. The
amendments to the section 1232 regulations were originally proposed in August 1964, but
were withdrawn and new proposals were substituted in September 1968 (33 Fed. Reg.
12,376), and were finally adopted in TI). 6984, 1969 INT. REv. BULL. No. 6, at 7 (Dec. 23,
1968).
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(ii), TI). 6984, 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 6, at 11.
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If stock or assets of a business were acquired in exchange for con-
vertible bonds or bonds with warrants, the above points were com-
plicated by the additional question as to the extent and manner in
which discount arose when such properties, rather than money, con-
stituted the consideration for issuance of the securities. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, to find legislative refinements proposed (generating
original issue discount in this case) when the opportunity for revision
appeared with the introduction of H.R. 13270.42
3. "Original Issue" Premium
Where debentures issued to acquire stock or business assets trade
(at or about the closing date of the transaction) at a premium (or if it
otherwise appears that the fair market value of the assets of the acquired
business exceeds the face amount of the instruments), the possibility
exists that the Treasury will assert that the bonds were issued at a
premium. In such event, the converse of the situation which obtains
in connection with bonds issued for property at a discount arises; the
issuing corporation would be required (under regulations at the close
of 1968) to include the amount of the premium in income to be pro-
rated or amortized over the life of the instrument. 43 If convertible
bonds were utilized to effect the acquisition, the regulations exclude
any part of the premium determined to be "attributable to a conversion
feature.144 If the debentures are issued as part of an investment unit
which encompasses warrants, the part of the consideration referable
to the warrants is similarly not treated as part of the premium. 45
Whether a premium will exist upon issuance of a convertible
42 Tax Reform Act § 413(b) amends IRC § 1232(b)(2) in order to adopt the rule set
forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(ii), relating to the allocation of the purchase price
between the debt and the warrants. The amendment further provides that:
in the case of a bond or other evidence of indebtedness, or an investment unit
[consisting of an option or other security issued together] . . . which is issued for
property and which- (A) is part of an issue a portion of which is traded on an
established securities market, or (B) is issued for stock or securities which are
traded on an established securities market, the issue price of such bond or other
evidence of indebtedness or other investment unit, as the case may be, shall be
the fair market value of such property.
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2), T.D. 6984, 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 6, at 10.
44 See id. § 1.61-12(c)(2), (5), Treas. Reg. § 1.171-2(c), T.D. 6984, 1969 INT. RFv. BULL.
No. 6, at 10, provides that "for the purposes of determining the amount of amortizable
bond premium on a convertible bond for the taxable year, the amount of bond premium
shall not include any amount attributable to the conversion features of the bond."
45See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(4), T.D. 6984, 1969 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 6, at 10,
which defines bond premium as "the excess of the issue price of the bond (as defined in
paragraph (b)(2) of § 1.1232-3) over the amount payable at maturity (or in the case of
callable bond, at the earlier call date)." Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2) provides that where a
warrant (i.e., "an option') constitutes part of the investment unit "the issue price of the
obligation includes only that portion of the initial offering price . . . properly allocable
to the obligation .. "
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debenture or a debenture accompanied by a warrant may largely be a
function of the difficult determination of fair market value of the
acquired assets in relation to the face amount of the debenture, and
the conversion feature, or the warrant, as the case may be. The fact
that a determinable amount of securities trade, at or about the closing
date of the transaction, for an ascertainable price, certainly indicates
the market's evaluation of the transaction. On the other hand, it seems
difficult to ignore the impact of general conditions upon trading prices
during the same period. Questions of "blockage" must also be con-
sidered, since it would seem unreasonable to value the entire going
concern by reference to the trading prices of what, in most instances,
would represent a very limited portion of the total number of securities
which are issued.46 Finally, an independent appraisal of the business
assets may well suggest a relationship between the face amount of the
debentures and the conversion feature or the warrant which differs
from (or should be taken into account in determining) the value of the
stock or assets acquired in relation to the face amount of the deben-
tures.
There exists also the question of whether a premium can arise
upon the issuance of securities for property, much in terms of the
comparable issues considered to exist prior to the 1969 legislation re-
specting original issue discount. Where the bonds are convertible or
include warrants as part of the investment unit, and the value at-
tributable to the conversion privilege or the warrant is ascertainable,
and that amount plus the face amount of the debenture does not equal
the total trading price4 7 of the security or the unit, serious possibility
exists that premium is present. This question, both before and after
the 1969 legislation, is additionally complicated by the distinctions
drawn in that legislation between readily traded securities, where
original issue discount can exist, and other securities (including those
issued in reorganizations) where it cannot exist.4 8 The absence of
congressional action could be taken to suggest the nonexistence of
premium in any case in which property is acquired, since, had Con-
gress so chosen, the rules now applicable in connection with original
issue discount under section 1232 could have been, but were not, ap-
plied to "original issue" premium.
46 See Champion v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'g 19 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 253 (1960); Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943); Helvering
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938); Rogers v. Strong, 72 F.2d 455
(3d Cir. 1934); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (1958). But see Mott v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d
317 (6th Cir. 1943).
47 Or value, however otherwise ascertained.
48 I.R.C. § 1232(b)(2), as amended Tax Reform Act § 413(b).
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4. Repurchase Premium
Congress did, however, act to settle questions relating to the tax
treatment of the premium paid by an issuer upon repurchase of its
convertible debt.
An issuer, repurchasing its convertible debt, may pay a premium
to the holder to reflect the fact that the debt carries an interest rate
higher than that prevailing under then current market conditions. The
repurchase premium, as compensation to the investor for his loss of
future interest, is deductible by the purchaser (issuer) and includible
in the gross income of the seller (holder).4 Premiums paid by the
issuer, however, may not reflect lower interest rates alone. Rather, all
or a portion of the premium may be attributable to the value of the
conversion feature. Since the cost incurred by the corporation in re-
acquiring its own stock is not deductible,5" the repurchase premium
attributable to the value of the conversion feature should not be a
deductible expense.
In Roberts & Porter, Inc. v. Commissioner,51 however, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit permitted the taxpayer to deduct a
$77,000 premium paid on repurchase of its convertible notes. While it
viewed the repurchase premium as attributable to the conversion fea-
ture, it held the premium deductible since "[t]here is no provision in
the Code or Regulations which organizes allocation of the total pur-
chase price to the value of the conversion feature." 52 The decision
placed the Treasury in a position where it could be whipsawed upon
a repurchase of convertible debt. Indeed, the corporation now would
be likely to deduct any premium paid upon repurchase. The holder,
on the other hand, could assert the premium was attributable solely
to the conversion feature of the bond and thus could treat as a pre-
mium an item of capital gain under section 1232.
The Service therefore announced that it would not follow Roberts
& Porter,53 and only amounts attributable to the cost of borrowing
49 See General Am. Life Ins. Co., 25 T.C. 1265 (1956).
50 I.R.C. § 311(a).
51307 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1962), rev'g 37 T.C. 23 (1961), acquiesced in, 1962-1 Cum.
BULL. 4.
52 The court referred to the 1950 amendment to section 125 of the 1939 Code (now
section 171 of the 1954 Code) which denies to the holder of a bond the right to amortize
that portion of the original issue price attributable to the conversion feature. But
Congress would not, then or later, eliminate or limit the deduction by an issuing
corporation of such part of any premium, attributable to a conversion feature,
which the corporation may have paid when repurchasing its own bonds. If the
situation represents a breach in our revenue wall, its repair must be effected by
legislative action rather than by judicial interpretation.
Id. at 747-48.
53 See Rev. Rul. 409, 1967-2 Cuma. Buu.. 62.
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money would be deductible as repurchase premium. Moreover, 1968
amendments to the regulations provide that the issuer of convertible
debt which pays a premium upon the repurchase may deduct only
one year's interest, "except to the extent that the corporation can
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commissioner or his delegate,
that an amount in excess of one year's interest does not include any
amount attributable to the conversion feature." 54
Nevertheless, in view of the uncertainty created by Roberts &
Porter, the Treasury recommended as part of its tax reform proposals
that the corporation's deduction for bond repurchase premium be
limited to an amount not in excess of a normal call premium for
corporate indebtedness.55
5. Installment Method
Among the most intriguing issues which arose in the several years
preceding introduction of H.R. 7489 was the possibility that a share-
holder exchanging shares for debentures (whether or not convertible
and whether or not with warrants attached) could utilize the install-
ment method of reporting the gain realized by him on the exchange.
This issue had been presented to the Internal Revenue Service for
ruling at least as early as 1965.50 Unresolved questions included:
whether the installment provisions were intended to apply to market-
able instruments; whether the requisite selling price could be
ascertained in the case of a convertible debenture; if the debenture did
not provide for interim payments prior to maturity, whether an in-
stallment obligation in fact existed; if an installment obligation did
exist in the case of a convertible debenture, whether gain was realized
at the time of conversion; if gain were realized, whether the amount
to be recognized is limited by the issue price or includes a greater fair
market value; if the acquisition were effected under local law by stat-
utory merger (which would probably be fully taxable because of lack
of continuity of interest), whether installment treatment would be
unavailable in any event because a constructive liquidation in the
selling shareholders' hands, prior to the transfer of the assets, is deemed
to have occurred. 57
54Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(c)(2), T.M. 6991, 1969 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 8; see also
Rev. Rul. 243, 1969 INT. Rxv. BuLL. No. 20, at 8.
55 HEMNGs at 5481 (statement of Edward S. Cohen, Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury for
Tax Policy).
58 See SPARTAN INDUS., INC., OFFER OF EXCHANGE TO HOLDEIS oF CommoN STocit OF
ATLANTIC THRIFT CENTERS, INC. 2 (Dec. 17, 1965).
57 See generally Appert, Installment Reporting as a Substitute for a Tax-Free Re-
organization, 22 TAX LAW. 157 (1968).
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Despite the foregoing uncertainties, highly responsible counsel
have issued opinions concluding that the installment method may be
elected (assuming the acquisition was effected for stock and not in a
statutory merger and that the other conditions of section 453 are met).
To insure that the down payment does not exceed 30 percent of the
selling price, efforts were made to establish that the value of warrants
accompanying the debentures (or that the value attributable to the
conversion feature) did not exceed 30 percent of the face amount of
the obligation. To establish that the obligation constituted an install-
ment instrument, its terms provided for two payments (often very near
maturity and very minimal in amount, such as 5 percent of face).
Counsels' opinions also took the view that although income arises
upon conversion, no effect, at that point, was to be given to the in-
crement in value, if any, in excess of face amount.58
No attempt will be made here to evaluate the validity of the fore-
going views. The Government's concern respecting the possibility that
the courts would support counsels' view (or at least that the area would
have remained permanently unsettled) is reflected in the legislation first
initiated through H.R. 7489.
The stakes involved respecting this issue were considerable, both
in terms of revenue effect and, perhaps more importantly, vis-4-vis the
general taxing pattern of acquisition transactions. Basic to these is
the concept that the issuance of debt instruments as part of a corporate
acquisition constitutes an event for the recognition of gain. A valid
installment election serves to defer recognition of gain. Moreover, if
the holder of the instrument were elderly and the maturity date (and/
or the second payment date) were set sufficiently in the future, his death
could be anticipated before any tax became due. While income in
respect of a decedent would arise at the holder's death,5 9 the income
tax deduction available to the estate could approach, equal or exceed
the benefits to be derived from date-of-death basis available to the
seller had he held the initial shares for exchange in a nontaxable trans-
action. 60 Obviously, therefore, an acquisition program which contem-
58 See, e.g., CRANE Co., OFFER OF EXCHANGE TO HOLDERS OF COMMON STOCK OF WESTING-
HOUSE AIR BRAKE Co. 6-7 (Apr. 8, 1968); TENNECO, INC., NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING OF
SHAREHOLDERS 3-5 (July 16, 1969).
59 Under section 691(a)(4), an amount equal to the excess of face value of the obliga-
tion over its basis in the hands of the decedent (determined under section 453(d)(2)) is
considered income in respect of a decedent. The decedent's estate or heirs must include
in gross income, when received, the same proportion of any installment payment as would
be includible in the decedent's gross income if he had lived and received such payment.
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-5. Death is not an occasion for the acceleration of gain inherent
in an installment obligation. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(e) (1958).
60 The recipient of income in respect of a decedent (I.R.D.) is entitled, under § 691(c),
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plated the issuance of debt and seller's election of the installment
method gave the seller, in large measure, the benefits of a nontaxable
reorganization, yet allowed the buyer to receive the leverage and income
tax benefits accruing from the interest deduction, plus, if financially
beneficial, a possible stepped-up basis were liquidation of the acquired
company undertaken.
IL H.R. 7489
As introduced H.R. 748961 would have added section 277 to the
Code, disallowing the deduction for interest if the following circum-
to deduct the portion of the federal estate taxes attributable to the I.R.D. against such
income. An estate's realization of I.R.D. derived from an installment obligation may be
advantageous since a substantial portion of each installment payment may consist of long-
term capital gains. The full amount of the gain is utilized in determining the § 691(c)
deduction for estate taxes, but not more than 50 percent of such gain is subject to such
tax as I.R.D. in the hands of the recipient. Rev. Rul. 481, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 279. Con-
ceivably, the excess § 691(c) deduction generated by an installment sale could produce a
greater tax benefit than the forgiveness of capital gains at death if no installment sale
had occurred.
01 The full text of HR 7489 follows:
91sT CONGRESS
1sT SEssioN
H.R. 7489
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FEBRuARY 24, 1969
Mr. Mills introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee on Ways and Means
A BILL
Relating to the tax treatment of certain indebtedness incurred by
corporations in acquiring stock of other corporations.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress, assembled,
3 That (a) (1) part IX of subchapter B of chapter 1 of the
4 Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to items not
5 deductible) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
6 following new section:
7 "SEC. 277. INTEREST ON INDEBTEDNESS INCURRED BY
8 CORPORATION TO ACQUIRE STOCK IN AN-
9 OTHER CORPORATION.
10 "If, pursuant to a plan-
11 "(1) one corporation acquires stock of another
12 corporation, and
1 "(2) more than 35 percent of the consideration for
2 the stock so acquired consisted of evidence of indebted-
3 ness of the acquiring corporation or of other property
4 attributable to borrowing by the acquiring corporation,
5 then the amount which (but for this section) would be allow-
6 able to the acquiring corporation or to any other person as a
7 deduction for any taxable year for interest paid or accrued
8 with respect to such evidences of indebtedness or other bor-
9 rowing (or with respect to any refinancing thereof) shall be
10 reduced to the amount obtained by multiplying the amount
11 of such interest by a fraction the numerator of which is 35
12 percent and the denominator of which is the percentage
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stances had occurred: (1) one corporation had acquired stock of another
corporation; (2) more than 35 percent of the consideration consisted
of debt of, or "other property attributable to borrowing by," the
acquiring corporation. The amount of the disallowance varied directly
with the percentage of the consideration issued as debt. If 35 percent
or less of such consideration consisted of debt, then section 277 would
not have applied.
Because certain of the points raised in relation to H.R. 7489 are
dealt with, or are inherent in, section 279 as finally enacted, it is ap-
propriate to identify the areas of concern which first appeared in
Chairman Mills' proposal. No portion of the language of H.R. 7489
relates specifically to "mergers," "conglomerate" or otherwise. And al-
though a "plan" of acquisition was required, the interest deduction
could have been disallowed under that Bill whether or not sufficient
stock was obtained under such plan to effect a corporate combination.
Further, H.R. 7489 did not differentiate between stock acquisitions
which are "friendly" and those which constitute the "surprise take-
overs," referred to by Chairman Mills in his press statement.6 2 Nor did
it differentiate between the "highly speculative" securities, mentioned
in the press announcement, and bonds of impeccable quality. Unlike
13 arrived at under paragraph (2)."
14 (2) The table of sections for such part IX is amended
15 by adding at the end thereof the following:
"Sec. 277. Interest on indebtedness incurred by corpora-
tion to acquire stock in another corporation."
16 (b) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall
17 apply with respect to indebtedness incurred by stock acquired
18 after February 24, 1969, whether the indebtedness was in-
19 curred on, before, or after such date.
20 SEC. 2. (a) Section 453(b) of the Internal Revenue
21 Code of 1954 (relating to electing the installment method of
22 reporting gain on casual sales of personal property) is
23 amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
24 paragraph:
1 "(3) RULE FOR APPLYING PARAGRAPH (2).-A
2 bond or debenture issued by a corporation or by a
3 government or political subdivision thereof, with inter-
4 est coupons or in registered form, shall not be treated
5 as an evidence of indebtedness of the purchaser for
6 purposes of paragraph (2) of this subsection."
7 (b) The amendment made by subsection (a) shall
8 apply to sales or other dispositions made after February 24,
9 1969. In the case of sales or other dispositions made on or
10 before such date, the determination of what constitutes evi-
11 dences of indebtedness of a purchaser for the purposes of
12 section 453(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
13 shall be made without inferences drawn from the fact that
14 the amendment made by subsection (a) does not apply to
15 such sales or dispositions."
62 See House Ways and Means Committee Release, supra note 2.
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section 279, H.R. 7489 did not cover asset acquisitions.P3 While the
reasons for this position are not expressed, it would appear that the
Chairman's interest was centered on the typical take-over bid which
involved a tender offer for shares rather than a statutory merger (which
required a negotiated agreement and probably deprived the sellers of
any attempted installment election).
H.R. 7489, however, clearly contemplated an interest disallowance
where cash was used to effect the stock purchase when the cash was
acquired from the proceeds of a loan effected for that purpose. Indeed,
the phrase "attributable to borrowing," as used in the Bill, appeared
sufficiently broad to empower the Internal Revenue Service to relate
a portion of an acquiring company's general debt structure to stock
acquisitions.64
Because of the breadth of its language, H.R. 7489 potentially
swept within its scope the following: acquisitions of shares of a closely
held corporation, whether a ready market existed for such shares or
not; acquisitions of shares of "related" corporations, including those
owned by the same or a related shareholder as well as in an affiliated
group; acquisitions of shares as part of a "primary" offering of securities
where the seller of the shares is the issuing corporation; acquisitions of
shares of a foreign subsidiary or affiliate where the foreign corporation
derives its earnings abroad and is established to comply with the U.S.
foreign direct investment program. Moreover, no distinction was made
between the acquisition of voting or nonvoting shares.
H.R. 7489 also dealt with the installment method problem. It
withdrew from treatment as "an evidence of indebtedness of the pur-
chaser" a bond or debenture issued by a corporation or governmental
entity "with interest coupons or in registered form."6' 5 The important,
but essentially technical, refinements which were added to the statute's
final form cannot obscure the fact that this single sentence, proposed to
be made effective concurrently with the Bill's introduction, effectively
eliminated the use (or attempted use) of the installment method pro-
visions as a means of deferring gain in debt financed acquisitions.
Moreover, H.R. 7489 provided that, in the case of installment sales
occurring before the proposed effective date, the determination of
whether debentures of the type described in the Bill qualified as install-
63 See I.R.C. § 279(b)(1)(B).
64 Compare HR 7489 § 1 with I.R.C. § 265(2). See also Wisconsin Cheeseman, Inc. v.
United States, 388 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1968); Illinois Terminal R.R. v. United States, 375
F.2d 1016 (Ct. of Claims 1967); Bernard H. Jacobson, 28 T.C. 579 (1957).
65 HR 7489 § 2; thus a debenture issued in a corporate acquisition would be treated
as an immediate payment, subject to the 30 percent rule of IR.C. § 453(b)(2)(A).
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ment obligations "shall be made without inferences drawn from the
fact that the amendment .. . does not apply to such sales or dis-
positions. ' 66 That the provision did not survive in either the statute
as finally enacted or in the Committee Reports suggests that the courts
are free to construe section 453 with "insight" unencumbered by the
1969 legislation.
III. Ti TAx REFORm Acr OF 1969
By availing itself of the fuller array of facts presented at the
hearings, and utilizing the Internal Revenues Service's experience in
connection with regulations respecting original issue discount (includ-
ing the Treasury tax policy staff's expertise in the financial market
place), the Ways and Means Committee was in a position to report on
amendments which dealt less abrasively with the problems heretofore
discussed.67 In consequence, a comprehensive statutory pattern now
emerges which treats the deductibility of the interest, the amortization
of debt discount, and the deductibility of "repurchase" premium at the
issuing company level. Rules are also provided for selling shareholders
respecting the nonavailability of installment treatment and the degree
of inclusion in income of original issue discount.68
This portion of this paper seeks to describe the substance and
interplay of these provisions.
1. Disallowance of Interest Paid on Corporate Acquisition
Indebtedness
The principal provision of the 1969 legislation pertinent to the
subject matter of this paper is section 279. This section superimposes
upon section 163 a specific disallowance of the deduction for interest
amounts exceeding $5 million69 paid or incurred during the taxable
66 HR 7489 § 2. The Government was well aware of the various documents filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, which were publicly available, indicating
that legal opinions had been rendered to the effect that recipients of marketable deben-
tures issued in a corporate acquisition could elect the installment method. See H.R. REP.
No. 413, supra note 7, at 107; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., ist Sess. 144 (1969) [hereinafter
S. RnP. No. 552].
67 House Version §§ 411-14.
68 In addition to provisions limiting the deductibility of interest arising in connection
with debt-financed acquisitions and the availability of the installment election in such
cases, the House Bill also dealt with original issue discount and deduction of bond pre-
mium upon repurchase. The substance of the House Bill was adopted and refined by the
Senate, and a new provision was added dealing specifically with the debt-equity problem.
Tax Reform Act § 411, I.R.C. § 279.
69 The $5 million limitation, however, is reduced by the amount of interest paid or
incurred on obligations issued after December 31, 1967, to finance corporate acquisitions,
but which do not fall within the definition of "corporate acquisition indebtedness." I.R.C.
§ 279(a)(2). Such obligations include those used to finance acquisitions of foreign corpo-
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year with respect to "debt '70 issued as consideration for the acquisition
of corporate shares or assets where, as of a specified date,71 the follow-
ing conditions are met.
(a) If stock is acquired, the issuing company owns (at the close of
the year in which the acquisition debt is issued) more than 5 percent
of the total voting power of the acquired corporation.72 Excluded from
this rule is stock of existing controlled subsidiaries. 73
(b) If assets are acquired, the acquisition encompasses a plan un-
der which at least two-thirds (measured by value) of all of the corporate
"operating assets" (excluding money) are obtained by the issuing com-
pany.74
(c) The obligation of the issuing corporation is, or becomes, sub-
ordinated to its trade creditors generally or is "expressly subordinated"
in right of payment to "any substantial amount" of such corporation's
unsecured debt.7 5
(d) The debt is "directly or indirectly" convertible into the issuing
corporation's stock or is issued as part of an investment unit or "other
arrangement" which includes, in addition to the debt, a warrant or
option to acquire "directly or indirectly" the issuing corporation's
stock.76
(e) As of the last day of a taxable year of issuance, either the
issuing corporation's "ratio of debt to equity" exceeds 2 to 1 or its
"projected earnings" do not exceed three times the annual interest to
be paid or incurred.77
Within the framework of these principal 78 rules, certain limitations
and problems of construction may be noted.
rations and those not subject to disallowance of interest by reason of the 3 year rule and
5 percent stock rule.
70 But see I.R.C. § 285, which specifically authorizes the Commissioner to publish
guidelines for determining whether a corporate obligation is, in fact, "debt." Moreover,
section 279G) provides that "No inference shall be drawn from any provision in this
section that any instrument * * * represents an obligation or indebtedness of [the] issuer
in applying any other provision of this title."
71 See I.R.C. § 279(c)(1), (d).
72 Id. § 279(d)(5).
73 Id. § 279(e).
74 Id. § 279(b)(1)(B).
75 Id. § 279(b)(2). The unsecured debt with respect to which the subordination of the
corporate acquisition indebtedness is measured may be subsequently issued. Id. § 279(b)
(2)(B)_
70 Id. § 279(b)(8).
77 Id. § 279(b)(4).
78 There is omitted from this discussion the narrow rules of section 279 relating to
banks and finance companies (Id. § 279(c)(5)), acquisitions of certain foreign corporations
(Id. § 279()), and certain transitional provisions (Id. § 279(i)).
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a. $5 Million Limitation
As an apparent substitute for the vertical limitation of H.R. 7489
on the amount of debt which may be issued in any one acquisition
(i.e., "35 percent of total consideration"), Congress has adopted a $5
million horizontal limitation on interest deductible on all acquisition
debt. So structured, a corporation may issue and carry on today's
market approximately $50 to $60 million of subordinated debt without
concern under section 279 for the deductibility of the interest.79 A
"large" corporation may therefore make a single reasonably substantial
acquisition or a series of smaller ones utilizing subordinated debt,
whereas a small corporation, which may be closely held and could be
otherwise most troubled by the inhibitions of this provision (because of
a more expectable need for subordinated debt, for example), need have
no concern for it.
In this respect, the operation of the new statute would appear to
be most salutary; and a mechanism seems to have been created whereby
the large "paper" transactions, the stifling of which was the essential
objective of H.R. 7489, have been proscribed without undue inter-
ference with other business combinations which do not involve major
"take-overs" (whether friendly or hostile) of large corporate enterprises.
b. Stock and Assets
The less than 5 percent rule of section 279(d)(5) permits what may
be termed de minimis acquisitions of shares.80 At the same time, how-
ever, the statute is effective in the 5 to 50 percent range, before the
acquirer reaches the 51 percent level, preventing the purchase of sig-
nificant blocks of stock with subordinated debt prior to, but as part of,
a plan under which a tender offer is made for a controlling percentage
(whether absolute or "working") of a "target" company's shares.
It may also be observed that section 279 applies whether the
acquisition is "friendly" or "hostile." Further, as the section would
apply only if the requisite 5 percent amount is acquired with respect
to "the total combined power of all classes of stock entitled to vote,"
no limit would apply to the acquisition of nonvoting common or pre-
ferred shares. Moreover, so long as 5 percent of the total voting power
is not acquired (assuming the 5 percent rule is not applied separately
to each class of voting stock), the acquisition of a separate, bona fide
79 Assuming an average interest cost of 8-9 percent.
80 See S. R m. No. 552, at 143. Presumably, however, a rare case could be found where
less than 5 percent of the total voting stock constituted working control of a corporation.
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class of voting preferred stock, for example, should not be subject to
the provision."'
Because a sale of assets not in the ordinary course of business
normally necessitates approval of a majority of a selling corporation's
board of directors (as well as a stated percentage of its shares), a hostile
assets acquisition would be a rare, if not an impossible, event. It is
perhaps for this reason that section 279 is inapplicable unless two-
thirds of the company's operating properties are thus acquired.
On the other hand, the statute's exclusion of cash and other non-
operating assets from the test of whether two-thirds of the operating
assets have been acquired was incorporated into the legislation in order
to prevent the avoidance of the provision through the contribution to
the corporation of liquid items, or, even where the assets were not so
contributed, where the nature of the corporation's business is such that
a "large proportion" of its assets "consisted of cash or nonoperating
properties. 8s2
A somewhat more difficult question is presented with respect to the
measurement of the value of assets for the two-thirds requirement. If
gross value is used (i.e., assets without regard to the acquired corpora-
tion's liabilities), the requirement can be avoided more readily than
if the test were applied on a net basis (for example, if the percentage
were to be applied to the portion of the operating assets not acquired,
directly or indirectly, with borrowed funds). That the Congress in-
tended the stricter (net value) application of the test would, notwith-
standing, appear unlikely. Since the gravamen of the statute is the
acquisition of a corporation as a going concern, it should make no
difference whether part of the requisite two-thirds was initially ob-
tained by the acquired corporation with borrowed funds. Such an
approach, of course, assumes that these assets were needed in the
business. If they were not so needed, but were acquired with borrowed
funds for the purpose of structuring a transaction to escape section 279,
the two-thirds test would appear to be properly measured against the
assets on hand when the "plan" for the acquisition was first formulated
by the acquiring corporation.
To underscore the fact that the asset acquisition test is to be con-
strued in a relatively liberal manner, the Senate Finance Committee
Report also makes clear that assets which presumably have been used
81 I.R.C. § 279(d)(5).
82 S. REP. No. 552, at 159.
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in the corporation's business, but are "temporarily not actually used,"
will "retain" their operating character.8 3
Because a partial asset purchase as a step in an over-all business
acquisition plan would be an unlikely possibility, it was not felt
necessary to extend the statute to such events. Any other rule could
cast a cloud over any asset acquisition directly or indirectly effected
with subordinated debt (assuming the other conditions of section 279
were also present).
c. Use of Cash or Property "Attributable to" the Issuance of Corporate
Acquisition Indebtedness
Surprisingly, and quite unlike H.R. 7489, section 279 contains no
express prohibition against "indirect" use of corporate acquisition
indebtedness. This may occur, for example, if the acquiring company
first issues debt for cash and thereafter utilizes the funds to effect the
acquisition of stock or assets. To reach the same result, but perhaps to
avoid a statutory implication that a wide-ranging attribution require-
ment is in order, the reference to indirect use of cash is relegated to
the Committee Reports: "The term 'issued' includes the giving of a
note to a bank or other lender as well as the issuance of a bond or
debenture."8 4
Moreover, the strength of the statutory language itself, as the
Committee Report indicates, should provide ample opportunity for
future regulations under section 279 to cover cash purchases supported
by borrowings where, in fact, subordinated acquisition debt was issued
for that purpose. At the same time, however, a taxpayer is not exposed
to the possibility that a pro tanto reduction of the interest deduction
can be sustained in the case where a corporation has utilized subordi-
nated debt for general purposes (under circumstances where the debt-
equity ratios and the projected earnings formulae also apply), but where
there is no causal relationship between the existence of the borrowing
and the later purchase of shares or assets.
Where a corporation effects a cash purchase in a taxable year
subsequent to a year in which subordinated debt otherwise constituting
acquisition debt was issued, it would appear that the interest deduction
would be disallowed not only for the later year of purchase, but also
83 Id. The full sentence stated that "An asset which will be used in a corporation's
trade or business is to retain this status even though it is temporarily not actually used
in the business." While the sentence does not refer to the question of whether the asset
was used by a corporation before its current idle status, the word "retain" suggests prior
use.
84 S. REP. No. 552, at 142.
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for the earlier year or years during which the debt was issued and re-
mains outstanding. Such a result would follow from the rule requiring
a determination as to the existence of acquisition debt to be made as
of the last day of the taxable year in which all the conditions pertinent
to the definition are present and during which the debt was issued.85
The fact that no acquisition of stock or assets was made in the year of
issuance of the debt is not material if the purpose of issuance was "to
provide consideration" for an acquisition.
d. Subordination
Although the House version of section 279 would have limited
this test to obligations which were subordinated solely to the claims of
trade creditors, 6 the Senate added a provision, accepted by the House
which applied the test to obligations which were subordinated to "any
substantial" amount of unsecured debt. 7 This change resulted pre-
sumably from the belief that the trade-creditor rule could be too easily
avoided by issuing debentures which maintained a debt position pari
passu with trade creditors, but held, under the trust indenture, a
secondary position with respect to other debt.8
e. Debt to Equity Ratio
The success of the House in maintaining the 2 to 1 ratio as the
measure of the debt to equity test (over the Senate's attempt to raise
such ratio to 4 to 1) suggests a rather tight application of this rule. 9
In this connection, it may be noted that the ratio is developed in
relation to the assets' adjusted basis for determining gain rather than
in relation to their value.90 Whether such adjusted basis (which may
often be less, but could also be more, than fair market value) has
been the appropriate test under the decided case involving thin
capitalization is an unsettled question.9 1 The statute's utilization of
the adjusted basis rule suggests a stricter application of the test (on the
85 I.R.C. § 279(c)(1).
86 House Version § 411(a), I.R.C. § 279(b)(2).
87 I.R.C. § 279(b)(2)(B).
88 See S. REP. No. 552, at 139. An indenture may provide, for example, that subordi-
nated debt ranks below "Senior Debt." Thus, subordinated debt would be subject to any
post-issuance borrowing denominated Senior Debt, so that a corporation desiring to pay
trade creditors could first issue Senior Debt, and with the funds thereby obtained, satisfy
trade creditor, but not debenture, claims.
89 See H.R. RE'. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 307 (1969).
90 I.R.C. § 279(c)(2).
91 See, e.g., Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 578 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'g
289 F. Supp. 794 (D. Ore. 1965); Ainslie Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955), acquiesced in, 1956-2
CoAr. BULL. 9.
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assumption that value will in a generally inflationary economy exceed
basis as adjusted in most cases). More pragmatically, the adjusted basis
approach serves to avoid difficult valuation questions. The House
technical explanation establishes also that the debt-equity ratio test
is also to be applied by taking into account short-term as well as long-
term liabilities. 92 Here again is evidence of a Congressional (or Con-
gressional and/or Treasury staff) expression of a rule to prevent
avoidance of the statute through use of temporary debt.
f. Relationship of "Earnings" to Interest Cost
Following in general a version of informal Internal Revenue
Service ruling policy, section 279(b)(4)(B) and section 279(e)(3) permit
an issuing corporation to escape the definition of acquisition debt by
establishing that the annual "average" 93 of its earnings for the three-
year period preceding the issuance of the obligation represents an
amount at least three times the annual interest to be paid for the years
in question. Because no reduction is made for interest (paid or in-
curred), depreciation or amortization allowed,94 federal tax liabilities
or dividend distributions,95 a fair measurement of economic earnings
"coverage" with respect to the interest payments is provided.
An important set of rules prescribes the extent to which the earn-
ings and the interest obligations96 of the acquired corporation are to
be consolidated with the earnings and interest of the issuing corpo-
ration for purposes of applying the "projected earnings" test.97 Acquisi-
tion of "control," within the meaning of the reorganization definition
of section 368(c), or "substantially all the properties," of the acquired
corporation requires98 that the issuing corporation's earnings and in-
terest payments be combined with those of the acquired entity in as-
certaining whether the earnings and interest relationship exceeds the
statutory ceiling.
Because a similar control test applies in connection with authority
92 See H.R. REP'. No. 413, supra note 7, pt. 2, at 78.
93 "Average" earnings are to be determined under regulations, which will also provide
rules respecting average earnings for a period of less than a year or less than 3 years.
94 It is hoped that no distinction was intended between depreciation "allowed" and
"allowable," although both words could have been explored in the statute.
95 Other than those paid by the acquired to the issuing corporation.
96 Presumably, this would be interest payments with respect to debt of the acquired
corporation other than the acquisition indebtedness (which, of course, constitutes debt of
the issuing corporation).
97 I.R.C. § 279(c)(8)(A)(ii), (c)(4)(B).
98 See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 1232, 1233, which provides that the "sub-
stantially all" test for the purposes of "C" reorganizations is satisfied if 70 percent of the
value of the gross assets and 90 percent of the value of the net assets is acquired.
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to file consolidated returns pursuant to section 1504 or to liquidate
under section 332, the use of such 80 percent rule follows a consistent
pattern. As occurs, however, with any arbitrary and mathematically
prescribed standard, differences in result can arise depending upon
whether such test point is, or is not met, by a degree however small.
In the case of section 279, the results can be startling. If, upon a tender
offer, the requisite 80 percent shares are obtained, the "coverage"
provided by the acquired corporation's pre-tax earnings may be suf-
ficient (or can be calculated to be sufficient) to enable the combined
entity to gain sufficient earnings coverage to avoid the projected earn-
ings test. On the other hand, if control is not acquired, the issuing
corporation will not have the benefit of the normally profitable
acquired corporation's earnings. While such a consequence may cause
the instrument to be characterized as acquisition debt, it is also to be
observed that, if and when control is acquired, the combined results
for the two corporations may be utilized in applying the test for the
first taxable year in which such control is acquired.29 Thus, acquisition
of "control" in a taxable year may enable the issuing corporation to
escape section 279 for such later year and thereafter. Conceivably,
therefore, an issuing corporation could first lose the interest deduction
under section 279, but later regain it upon acquisition of the requisite
80 percent amount of shares. One may well speculate about the
premium which financial markets will place upon blocks of stock, the
sale of which would enable the issuing corporation to become fully
in "control" of the acquired entity.100
g. Extrication from Permanent Application of Provision
While the statutory intent clearly requires that characterization
of an instrument as corporate acquisition indebtedness will result in
permanent disallowance of the interest deduction, certain rules permit
change in such treatment if the circumstances of the taxpayer differ as
time passes.
The general rule, of course, provides that once an obligation is
deemed to constitute corporate acquisition indebtedness, it remains so
characterized for all subsequent taxable years. 1' 1 Escape from this
provision is available if (a) "control" is acquired, as heretofore noted,
99 The rule is not permissive.
100 While a similar situation obtains in connection with corporations seeking to
consolidate (or to liquidate subsidiaries), the result in a case of acquisition debt may be
more dramatic in light of the frequently hostile drcumstances in which corporate "take-
over" transactions arise.
101 I.R.C. § 279(d)(2).
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and the combined earnings results enable the corporation to avoid
application of the projected earnings test;10 2 (b) three consecutive tax-
able years pass, as of the close of each of which the issuing corporation's
debt-equity ratio or projected earnings coverage change sufficiently to
avoid the strictures of those provisions. 03 In such event, the issuing
corporation now having been "purged," may deduct interest for all
future years. Nothing in the statute suggests that the disallowance rule
could be reinstated where, in a subsequent year (having once met the
three consecutive years test), the corporation's financial circumstances
deteriorate so that it again fails to meet the debt-equity ratio or pro-
jected earnings requirements.
2. Rules Differentiating Between Debt and Equity- Section 385
To underscore the Congress' resolve that corporate earnings may
not be distributed as interest payments, and doubtless to settle in a
much more general context the question of whether corporate pay-
ments are interest or dividends, section 385 was added to the Code
granting authority to the Treasury to identify factors which will
establish the existence or nonexistence of a debtor-creditor relationship
between a corporation and the holder of its securities.
Section 385(b) sets forth a recitation of the factors relevant to "a
particular factual situation." These include: (1) the existence or non-
existence of a written unconditional promise to pay; (2) the existence
or nonexistence of an obligation to pay on demand or on specified
maturity date; (3) the requirement or lack of requirement to pay a
sum certain in money; (4) the requirement (or lack of it) that the
debt arise in return for "adequate" consideration in money or money's
worth; (5) requirement of payment of a fixed rate of "interest"; (6) the
existence of subordination or preference; (7) the ratio of debt to equity;
(8) the existence or nonexistence of convertibility; (9) the relationship
between holdings of stock and holdings of the instrument. While no
reference appears with respect to an investment unit which includes a
warrant or option to purchase common stock, there would appear
ample authority for its consideration. Other factors heretofore noted
by the courts, but not identified in the statute, include: (1) the existence
or nonexistence of a sinking fund; 04 (2) a requirement that payments
be made in all events, whether or not current earnings are available; 05
1o2 Id. § 279(d)(3).
103 Id. § 279(d)(4).
104 See, e.g., Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 183 (Ist Cir.
1962).
105 See, e.g., Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 95, aff'd, 146 F.2d 809 (lst Cir.
1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
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and (3) the provisions, in the event of default, for the acceleration of
the balance of payments due.106
While it is well beyond the scope of this paper to suggest specific
rules which will be the product of considerable discussion in the
Treasury, it should be observed that the regulations authorized by
section 385 will apply to disallow the interest deduction although a
corporate taxpayer may avoid the provisions of section 279. While the
latter provision applies with respect to "interest," the former de-
termination as to whether interest has been paid will be made under
section 385.107 Failure to meet the criteria there established will pre-
vent the taxpayer from entering the narrow provisions of section 279.
3. Original Issue Discount - Section 1232
The amendments to section 1232 and the addition of specific re-
porting requirements under section 6049 attempt to establish an inte-
grated statutory pattern for the treatment of original issue discount
at both the issuing corporation and holder levels. 08
The rules newly incorporated in section 1232 require that the
amount of the original issue discount (determined ratably on a
monthly basis for the life of the obligation) be includible in the gross
income of the holder.'0 9 Rules are also provided which extend the
statutory rationale to a purchaser of the obligation. 110 Such person
continues to include in income the unamortized balance or the original
issue discount, but reduces the amount so includible (on a ratable
basis over the remaining life of the obligation) by the excess of the
price paid over the original issue price plus a portion of the original
issue discount already includible in income."' To assist in the adminis-
tration of this provision and prevent loss of revenue at the holder
level, reporting requirements are incorporated in section 6049 requir-
ing the issuer to file information returns respecting the amount of
the discount with copy to the holder.112
More difficult is the question of determining the amount of the
original issue discount. The statute establishes, and thus puts to rest
the conceptual issue under prior law, the extent to which original
100 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-54, 1968-1 Cui. ULL. 69, 70.
lo7 See I.R.C. § 2790).
108 Tax Reform Act § 418.
109 I.R.C. § 1282(a)(3)(A).
110 I.R.C. § 1282(a)(3)(B). A "purchase" is defined as any acquisition of a bond if the
basis of the obligation is not determined by reference in whole or in part to the adjusted
basis of such obligation in the hands of the transferor or under section 101(a), relating
to property acquired from a decedent. Id. § 1232(a)(3)(C).
111Id. § 1232(a)(3)(B)(i), (ii).
112 Id. § 6049(a)(1), (c).
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issue discount can, or cannot, arise when debt is issued for property." 3
Whereas the House version of section 1232(b) would have provided
that the fair market value of property constitutes the issue price in
all cases, 114 the statute, by amendment on the Senate floor," 5 changed
such rule to limit its application to situations in which the debt in
exchange for which the property was acquired was either part of a
securities issue, a portion of which was traded "on an established secu-
rities market," or the acquired property was itself publicly traded stock
or securities.1 6 Even in such instance, if the acquisition transaction
itself were effected pursuant to a nontaxable reorganization under sec-
tion 368(a)(1) or an insolvency reorganization, no original-issue dis-
count arises, nor does original issue discount, so the statute makes com-
pletely clear, arise in any other situation in which the debt is issued
for property other than money. In these instances, the issue price is
the stated redemption price at maturity." 7
Although the Senate floor amendment limiting the cases in which
original issue discount can arise where debt is issued for property
narrows the problem of determination of the amount of such discount,
the public securities cases in which the question will arise still, it is
suggested for reasons previously noted, present problems of valuation.
Indeed, the Senate Finance Committee Report, while referring to the
necessity for a determination, sets forth no guidelines for ascertain-
ment of value." 8 Also to be noted is the possibly anomalous con-
sequence of a reorganization situation. If the extent of the debentures
in relation to the stock is sufficiently large to preclude characterization,
for purposes of section 368, of the acquisition as a statutory merger for
purposes of section 368(a)(1)(A), original issue discount will arise. On
the other hand, if the relationship of stock to the debentures satisfies
continuity of interest tests and other provisions of section 368, no
113Id. § 1232(b)(2).
114 House Version § 413(b).
115 See 115 CONG. REc. 15,577-78 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1969). Senator Williams, who intro-
duced the amendment, stated that the language of the Senate Bill "opened another loop-
hole in another area." In a letter to Senator Williams, John S. Nolan, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, indicated that the Government could be "whipsawed" because
of the "severe difficulty of valuing property not traded on some recognized exchange. The
issuing corporation will claim a low value for property received on issuance of its bonds in
order to obtain a bond discount amortization deduction. The bondholder will claim that
the property was worth the full face amount of the bonds so that he has no 'original issue
discount' income.... This would suggest there should be no original issue discount where
bonds are issued for property except where the bonds are traded on an established secu-
rities market or are issued for property which consists of securities so traded. In these
latter cases, the valuation problem (and thus the whipsaw danger) does not exist." Id.
116 I.R.C. § 1282(b)(2)(A), (B).
117 Id. § 1232(b)(2).
11s See S. REP'. No. 552, at 148.
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original issue discount will arise. The selling shareholders will be
taxed on the debentures received in the exchange as "boot" (usually,
but not necessarily always as a dividend) to the extent of their fair
market value. Where such fair market value is less than the issue price,
the selling shareholders can realize upon the discount as if the bond
had been sold.
4. Premium
To add partly to correlation of the taxing pattern in debenture
acquisitions, a new provision, section 249, restricts the amount which
a repurchasing corporation may deduct when it acquires its debentures
at a premium.119 By incorporating in the statute a rule, expressed, but
not applied with total success, in the regulations, 120 a corporation
which repurchases its obligations at a price in excess of "a normal
call premium" may not deduct such excess unless the corporation es-
tablishes to the Treasury's satisfaction that the amount of such excess
is attributable to the cost of borrowing and not the conversion feature
of the obligation.
It is to be observed that no reference is made in the 1969 legisla-
lation as to the treatment of the premium to the issuing corporation to
the extent it arises upon issuance of the obligation. It is important to
note that a provision respecting generation of income comparable to
section 249 was not added to the Code. To achieve full consistency,
language could have been developed to provide that the amount of
income arising from bonds issued at a premium would be limited, in
the case of convertible debt, to that portion of the premium attribut-
able to money rates, with the excess amount made referable to the
conversion feature (or the warrants, if issued as part of an investment
unit). In the absence of such language, reliance will continue to be
had upon that part of the regulations' 21- which does not treat as income
any portion of the excess of the issue price attributable to the conver-
sion feature. Any value in excess of the face amount of the debenture
and the amount determined to be referable to the warrant remains,
as heretofore noted, subject to premium income characterization.
IV. PERSPEcrviE
The dramatic dampening in the latter part of 1969 of the lush
and verdant merger climate which had flourished as the decade ap-
119 Tax Reform Act § 414.
120 Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(c) (1968).
121 Id. § 1.61-12(c)(2) (1968).
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proached maturity could not fairly be attributed to the acquisition
debt provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, stunning as was the
speed with which their passage occurred once reported by the Ways
and Means Committee. Other well-known factors certainly contributed
as much, and probably far more, to diminish somewhat the frenetic
pace with which 1969 had begun: the Government's policy of mon-
etary restraints which restricted funds available for cash acquisitions;
erosion in stock market prices generally with specific emphasis upon
the deterioration of earnings of conglomerates; and continued govern-
mental concern respecting concentration of ownership of industrial
resources. The sharp rise of interest charges to record heights seemed
also to have caused the cost of these issues to become prohibitive in
absolute terms, quite independently of tax deductions, and the lower
yields available with respect to convertible securities (or those accom-
panied by warrants). Without question the overhang since late Febru-
ary of 1969 of H.R. 7489, having a then current effective date and
expansive scope, also operated to make the typical debt equity take-
over "package" highly risky or unavailable. At no time, however, did
H.R. 7489 purport to deal with the broader question of the tax treat-
ment of mergers in a more general sense; indeed, by restricting the
scope of the provision to the category reflected in section 279, Congress
has successfully achieved a solution confined substantively to the purely
tax-motivated transaction which gave rise to the legislation's initial
introduction.
By the same token, H.R. 7489 and the issues it raised gave im-
petus to the Treasury's more general inquiry respecting the broader
question of whether "mergers or other consolidations among corpora-
tions, particularly in the area of the so-called conglomerate combina-
tions constitute[s] a threat to the competitive climate for U.S. business
and to growth opportunities for new firms.' 22 In testimony before
the Ways and Means Committee, presented on April 22, 1969, respect-
ing H.R. 7489, Assistant Secretary Edwin S. Cohen, for the Treasury,
stated as follows:
It is also appropriate to investigate the question whether the pres-
ent tax laws offer special inducements [to mergers]. From the evi-
dence presented to this committee and from the data [acquired by
the Treasury, it is apparent] ... that the basic tax provision en-
couraging the merger movement is that which accords tax-free treat-
ment to reorganizations. Over 90 percent of the mergers in recent
122 Hearings on Corporate Distributions and Adjustments Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 552 (1959).
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years have employed some form of tax-free reorganization. [The
Treasury is beginning an immediate study] ... of the application
of the reorganization provisions ... to see if the rules developed
some years ago are still appropriate to current conditions and prac-
tices.a23
In thus serving notice of the Treasury's intent to reexamine this
field, Mr. Cohen very properly made clear that "the total Congres-
sional concern should be reflected in a number of areas including pos-
sible extension of the antitrust laws, revision of security regulation and
accounting rules and regulation of bank loans to the extent that present
loan limitations facilitate new consolidations."' 2 4
While a comparison between the factors considered by the Con-
gress respecting debt-financed acquisitions and the broader area of
nontaxable reorganizations is not in all respects a perfect one, suffi-
cient relationship exists to suggest that comparable trend lines may
appear in legislation respecting the larger subject. Discussion of these
factors follows.
1. Characteristics of Merging Companies and Business Purpose
Although the 1969 legislation was introduced in the context of
hostile "take-overs" by "conglomerate" corporations, neither H.R.
7489 nor section 279 is framed in those terms. As enacted, section 279
encompasses not only conglomerate mergers of companies engaged
in noncompeting product lines but also so-called congeneric (horizon-
tal (competitive) and vertical (supplier)) acquisitions. Nor do the
friendly or unfriendly circumstances surrounding a merger transaction
affect the statute's applicability. Moreover, even if the specific terms
of section 279 are avoided, the overriding conditions of section 385,
authorizing the Treasury to prescribe regulations setting forth factors
to be taken into account in determining whether a debtor-creditor re-
lationship exists, must be satisfied.
Once implemented, the regulations can be expected to articulate
elements which will restrict the utilization of the interest deduction
to those cases in which the payee's interest in the acquiring business
is essentially nonproprietary in character.
A comparable methodology may be implemented to ascertain, as
the first of several premises, whether the circumstances of a purportedly
nontaxable acquisition justify - in terms of its economic merits -
such characterization. For example, it would not appear that antitrust
123 HEARINGS, Pt. 14, at 5493.
124 Id.
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issues which relate to the conglomerate or congeneric classification of
the merger are essentially matters of federal income tax concern. If
these or other public policy issues are present (for example, securities
law), appropriate effect can be afforded to each discipline so affected,
limited, however, by its proper sphere of influence. To measure all
of the foregoing -perhaps much more realistically than now occurs
under existing law and administration - consideration can be given
to enactment of a provision which would authorize the Treasury to
articulate in more detail the so-called "business purpose" doctrine in
a manner similar to that now authorized respecting characterization
of the debt-equity relationship under section 385. This doctrine, al-
though grounded in landmark decisions and ancient regulations, which
require that a corporate amalgamation "be undertaken for reasons
germane to the continuation of the business of a corporation a party
to the reorganization, '1 25 adds very little, in actual practice, to the
generality of the statute. Expression in more specific terms of a "busi-
ness purpose" doctrine which gives effect to the more subtle motiva-
tions involved in corporate combinations seems in order.
Among the points which could be considered are those, for ex-
ample, which concern the degree to which the availability of tax at-
tributes of the acquired company may have positively or artificially
induced effectuation of the transaction. Net operating losses constitute
an obvious example, and there are many others. The impact of related
rules which apply in other disciplines (for example, the accounting
presentation resulting from consummation of the reorganization) could
also be appropriately considered in terms of the consequences of non-
taxable or taxable characterization of the transaction.
Pertinent to the foregoing is a reexamination, suggested a decade
ago by the Advisory Group on Subchapter C,126 of the half-century old
assumption that the term "reorganization" as the touchstone of non-
taxability must necessarily apply uniformly at both the corporate and
shareholder levels. Policy considerations may well dictate that while
reorganization treatment is appropriate with respect to the acquiring
corporation, a different rule should obtain respecting the selling share-
holders, or the converse may be true. The dependency of present law
upon a single definition substantially prevents this result. It also pre-
125 Hearings, supra note 122, at 552. The following comment is made under "Matter
for Further Consideration": "The Advisory Group suggests that it may be found desirable
on further consideration to provide for complete nonrecognition of gain at the corporate
level, regardless of whether boot is received or whether, if received, it is distributed to
shareholders or paid over to creditors."
126 Then being considered as part of the pending tax revision proposals.
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cludes, with respect to the acquiring entity, partial reorganization treat-
ment, even though shareholders may incur, by reason of sales to third
persons, some tax.
Much more difficult than mere recitation of the desirability of
more flexibility is the development of workable rules which would
articulate circumstances under which reorganization treatment would
be granted (or required) at the corporate level. All that is intended to
be stated here is that the determination of whether a "purchase" or
"reorganization" has been effected with respect to an acquiring entity
should involve factors pertinent to that corporation's affairs, perhaps
focusing on the nature of the consideration surrendered by the acquir-
ing entity, rather than, to the degree now required under current ad-
ministration, upon actions of the transferors who sell their shares to
third persons.127
2. Shareholder Level Aspects
By eliminating the availability of installment treatment for "read-
ily tradable" evidences of debt, the 1969 legislation has enunciated
(or clarified, as only time and possibly litigation may tell) a policy which
treats as the equivalent of cash (to the extent of fair market value)
debt securities received as the consideration for the sale of a busi-
ness.128 It is significant that the strain upon the installment method
provisions must clearly become evident in connection with convertible
debentures or investment units accompanied by warrants, securities
which in the financial market place often possess an equity or propri-
etary cost.
The foregoing discussion suggests that whereas in the case of the
1969 legislation the central issue may have been corporate level con-
cern (for the interest deduction as an inducement factor), the Trea-
sury's reexamination of the nontaxable acquisition provisions may be
heavily focused on the shareholder level effects. These inquiries may
proceed from at least two aspects: (1) in the reorganization and sale
definitions, the question may turn on the manner in which the sellers'
continuity or interest in the acquiring corporation is maintained; (2)
in terms of concepts of taxation of wealth accretion and income real-
ization, reconsideration may be given to those events which econom-
ically generate gain and respecting which - giving due regard to the
127 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(g) (1955).
128 Where bonds are received as "boot," the Internal Revenue Service has consistently
taken the position that installment treatment is not available.
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financial and administrative factors involved -recognition (present
or deferred with assured tax) is appropriate.
Continuity of interest can be considered in terms of (a) the nature
of the proprietary or nonproprietary relationship which the seller holds
respecting the acquiring entity after the transaction, and (b) the degree
or remoteness of such relationship, measured by size of the business
or the percentage of resulting ownership.
Where the seller receives preferred, whether convertible or not,
and regardless of whether a right to vote attaches, its economic sig-
nificance to the holder is measured by the par amount of the instru-
ments plus, depending upon terms, dividend responsibilities.1 9 That
a selling shareholder may receive these instruments, but not convert-
ible subordinated debt, without tax130 justifies, it would seem, reex-
amination of the propriety of the distinction. While it is true that a
preferred shareholder is not a creditor, the existence of voting rights
(often extremely limited) does not obscure the fact that his stake in
the acquired enterprise may differ only as a matter of priority in liq-
uidation from that of the debenture holder. Even more questionable
is the drastic difference, to which reference has previously been made,
in the tax treatment to the issuing corporation.
At the other end of the spectrum may be placed nonvoting com-
mon, where the shareholder has no power or control over the enter-
prise's business, but whose financial stake in it is entirely dependent
upon its success or failure only after the rights of prior security holders
have been accounted for. Framed in these terms of proprietary risk, a
shareholder who exchanges securities for common stock may have al-
tered the character of his investment (depending upon the business
nature of the acquiring entity and its size in relation to the company
whose shares were surrendered) and (depending upon voting percent-
age) may have changed the degree of his control over the enterprise.
He maintains, nevertheless, a continuity of the order (in relation to
129 A different consideration would obtain if the preferred were convertible. While
the conversion right, if exercised, can place the preferred shareholder in the same position
as the common, such person, prior to exercise, has the protection of an economic floor
in terms of his risk relationship to the business. For this reason, the character of his
investment should, it is believed, be viewed in terms of its primary issuance (preferred)
character. There are, of course, limitless varieties of preferred shares, including those
which possess other characteristics which would cause them to be classified as other
than common stock (e.g., such as with respect to section 306). To avoid endless defini-
tional problems, any rule designed to exclude preferred stock from nontaxable receipt
in a reorganization would probably be phrased in terms comparable to those used for
section 306 purposes as stock "other than common stock" (section 306(e)(1)(A)).
130 The preferred may be nonvoting in a statutory merger and may possess limited
voting rights in a "B" or "C" reorganization. It may be convertible in all cases.
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prior securities) of his risk relationship to it. So viewed, the question
of the differing size and nature of the acquired and the acquiring en-
tity may not be regarded as material to continuity of interest as the
retention of the risk relationship. While it cannot be doubted that
the acquisition of a small single product line company by a large pub-
licly traded and diversified conglomerate enterprise may provide the
transferor with an investment instrument of essentially different qual-
ity, the value of that certificate continues to be measured to some de-
gree in terms of the fortunes of the acquired enterprise. 131
A reexamination of the propriety of this result could produce a
policy response ranging from total recognition (including treatment
of gain as a tax preference) to continuation of present law or even an
extension thereof (permitting a nontaxable "roll-over" of comparable
securities).
Also pertinent to review of the continuity of interest doctrine as
a measure of continued nontaxability is the treatment of cash or other
"boot" which may be received by the seller from the acquiring entity
or realized by him through the sale of some of his shares. Present ad-
ministrative practice authorizes a transactional characterization as a
reorganization, where the acquisition, if effected as a statutory merger,
includes boot emanating from the acquiring corporation. To produce
this result, at least 50 percent of the total consideration must consist
of stock of the acquiring company. 32 Such rule obtains even though
an individual shareholder, such as one dissenting from the transaction,
may be paid entirely in money. Where the transaction is effected as a
stock-for-stock reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B) or stock-for-
assets reorganization under section 368(a)(l)(C) (in which, except in
special circumstances, no boot may be received), the seller may often
convert a portion of the consideration received into cash or similar
property through the sale of the shares to third persons as part of or
immediately after the transaction's consummation. Here again, ad-
ministrative practice limits the number of aggregate shares which may
be disposed of to 50 percent of the aggregate consideration offered. 33
While these provisions give the acquiring corporation consider-
able flexibility in satisfying the differing needs of various shareholders,
it can here be contended that less capricious rules are needed. A "B"
or "C" reorganization should not be destroyed (with the attendant
stepped-up basis which results to the transferee corporation) with re-
131 Giving effect, of course, to market conditions generally.
132 See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 CuM. Bu.. 1232.
133 Id.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
spect to all the shareholders because of a de minimis issuance of boot.
Conversely, it is questionable whether the transferor shareholders
should be able to dispose of substantial shares for money to third per-
sons while reorganization consequences remain at both corporate and
shareholder levels.
Apart from continuity of interest considerations, an underlying
issue persists as to whether the effectuation of a corporate acquisition
for securities, in a case in which gain is realized, represents an appro-
priate point at which to exact a tax. Put another way, in terms of the
theme propounded by Assistant Secretary Cohen and Chairman Mills,
does the absence of such exaction so distort the nontax economics of
the transaction so as to produce affirmatively an event which would, or
would not have occurred, principally depending upon tax effects.
In the half-century which has passed since statutory reference
was first made to reorganization exchanges, justification for nonrecog-
nition treatment has been offered on the grounds that the exchanges
were "purely paper" in nature; "merely changes in form and not in
substance"; or involving a "mere rearrangement" of the corporate
structure. In today's economy, it is difficult to apply such a character-
ization to the complex combination of events which constitute a cor-
porate combination.
Perhaps the issue having most current relevance in the light of
today's economic climate and the concern, generally, with mergers,
relates to the marketability or liquidity of the securities received by
the shareholder. If, as often occurs, a closely held enterprise is acquired
by one whose shares are publicly traded, the selling shareholder may
well have converted a nonliquid investment into one which is "readily
tradable" in the market place and which is (at least in part) giving ef-
'fect to blockage and similar considerations, or may be the equivalent
of cash. Without question, the opportunity to enter into transactions
of this nature (particularly when coupled with the economic diversifi-
cation and assumed liquidity for estate tax purposes) has certainly
occasioned reorganization exchanges. It has been vigorously argued 34
that transactions in which the stock received is publicly traded and
"hence in substance the equivalent of cash" justifies, or even requires,
the imposition of tax. Assuming the validity of the rationale of the
rule, its implication raises numerous technical difficulties. A large
block of stock constitutes the equivalent of cash only to the extent
that it has in fact been sold and a determinable amount realized. In-
134 See Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1957).
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vestment letters which now accompany reorganization exchanges in
many cases require the holding of the shares for an indeterminate
period of time at the conclusion of which the value may differ con-
siderably from that which obtained at the time of the exchange.
The development of provisions which would delineate circum-
stances in which shares would, or would not, be regarded as readily
tradable (such as the shares traded on selected national exchanges)
could divert reorganization transactions to companies not so listed.
Valuation by reference to quoted market prices will not necessarily
represent a measurement of true value. A rule which taxes only the
shareholders of the acquired corporation will inject an artificial note
into the bargaining between corporations of relatively equal size. Fur-
ther, in any situation in which the acquisition (because of the nature
of the acquired business) effects a substantial change in the character
of the acquiring entity, a rule taxing only the surrendering share-
holders would seem to enable, perhaps inappropriately, the share-
holders of the acquiring entity to avoid an equivalent imposition of
tax.
If, notwithstanding, a rule were to be considered in terms which
withdrew in whole or in part nonrecognition treatment in any of these
situations, such rule should be limited to those cases where the surren-
dering shareholder can effectively, i.e., actually through consummated
sales of securities or distributions as part of the transaction, realize
funds with which to pay the tax.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1969 legislation has effectively and, in general, fairly circum-
scribed tax inducements to debt-financed acquisitions. In thus legis-
lating with respect to one segment of corporate combinations,
reexploration has been summarized with respect to the larger question
of the taxation of other nontaxable reorganizations. As the differential
between ordinary income and capital gains has narrowed, the gap be-
tween nonrecognition treatment and capital gains has correspondingly
increased. The strain upon the reorganization definition has therefore
become increasingly great.
If legislative inquiry is undertaken, it is hoped that this will
occur in a balanced framework which will take into account not only
tax and nontax disciplines, but also the business essentiality of con-
tinuing consummation of normal corporate rearrangements.
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